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The Eighth Circuit Set to Grapple with Sexual Orientation 
Discrimination 
 
By Kenny Bohannan* 
 
The Eighth Circuit is set to weigh in on a topic of recent interest to many of 
her sister circuits: whether Title VII’s bar on employer discrimination 
“because of … sex” encompasses a bar on discrimination based upon sexual 
orientation as well. Slated for oral arguments en banc this term, Horton v. 
Midwest Geriatric Management is poised to definitively answer this 
question in the Eighth Circuit.   
 
In Horton v. Midwest Geriatric Management, Mark Horton alleged that 
Midwest Geriatric Management withdrew an offer of employment after he 
disclosed he was married to a same-sex partner.1 This claim was dismissed 
with the District Court largely relying upon the Eighth Circuit’s 1989 
holding in Williamson v. A.G. Edwards and Sons, Inc. that “Title VII does 
not prohibit discrimination against homosexuals.”2 
 
The Second and Seventh Circuits have recently found that Title VII bars 
discrimination based upon sexual orientation. The Second and Seventh 
Circuits in Zarda v. Altitude Express and Hively v. Ivey Tech Community 
College, respectively, revisited and overturned longstanding circuit 
precedents accepting three different legal theories that sexual orientation 
discrimination is barred by Title VII: (1) discrimination based upon sexual 
orientation is necessarily discrimination “because of … sex,” (2) sexual 
orientation discrimination is a form of “associational discrimination,” and 
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1 Horton v. Midwest Geriatric Management, No. 4:17CV2324 JCH, 2017 WL 6536576, at *2 
(E.D. Mo. Dec. 21, 2017). 
2 Id. at *3 (quoting Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989)). 
3 See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. 
Coll. Of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 




Conversely, in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, the Eleventh Circuit has 
recently reaffirmed a longstanding precedent that “[d]ischarge for 
homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII...”4 
 
This is not a question of first impression for the Eighth Circuit. In 
Williamson v. A.G. Edwards and Sons, Inc., a gay male alleged he was 
terminated for being openly homosexual in violation of Title VII.5 In a brief 
opinion, the Eighth Circuit held that “Title VII does not prohibit 
discrimination against homosexuals.”6 This single sentence served as the 
beginning and end of any legal analysis of Title VII’s applicability to sexual 
orientation discrimination in Williamson. Although Horton may provide 
the same legal conclusion as Williamson, legal spectators should expect a 
much more thorough analysis of the issue. 
 
Williamson did not grapple with the Supreme Court’s holding in Price 
Waterhouse that discrimination based upon “sex stereotypes” were 
impermissible under Title VII.7 Lower courts have had “difficulty in 
drawing a line between sex stereotypes, which are actionable under Title 
VII, and notions of heterosexuality and homosexuality, which are not.”8 
Such line-drawing can result in odd results where an openly homosexual 
man would be able to pursue a “sex stereotyping” theory if he faced 
discrimination for being perceived as “effeminate,” but not if he were 
discriminated against for merely being homosexual, as in that case he 
would still be conforming to the male stereotype.9 This line drawing has led 
some courts, such as the Seventh Circuit in Hively, to call this line between 
sexual orientation discrimination and sex stereotype discrimination so 
 
4 850 F.3d 1248, 1256 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th 
Cir. 1979)). 
5 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989). 
6 Id. 
7 It should be noted that Williamson was decided after Price Waterhouse, but only within a 
few months. 
8 Pambianchi v. Ark. Tech Univ., 95 F.Supp.3d 1101, 1114 (E.D. Ark. 2015). 
9 Bre Wexler, Let’s Call It What It Is: Sexual Orientation Discrimination Is Sex Discrimination 
Under Title VII, 63 St. Louis U. L.J. 1, 12 (2018) (“In other words, employees who 
experience discrimination based on apparent gender nonconforming behaviors may be 
successful on their Title VII sex discrimination claim, whereas those who experience 
discrimination as a result of purely being homosexual would not.”). 
 




“gossamer-thin” that it does not exist at all.10 The Eighth Circuit should be 
expected to address these arguments in Horton, either clearing the 
confusion for how these lines should be drawn or following the Seventh 
Circuit’s conclusion that they do not exist at all. 
 
The precedent upon which Williamson relied only reinforce the need for 
the Eighth Circuit to address Price Waterhouse’s applicability to sexual 
orientation discrimination claims. The only brief citation provided for 
Williamson’s conclusion that “Title VII does not prohibit discrimination 
against homosexuals,” is to the Ninth Circuit’s 1979 abrogated opinion in 
DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.11 In DeSantis, three male employees 
alleged sex-based discrimination by their employer because they were 
homosexuals.12 In rejecting their Title VII claim the Ninth Circuit 
“conclude[d] that Congress had only the traditional notions of ‘sex’ in 
mind,” holding that “sex” for the purposes of Title VII was meant to be 
construed narrowly.13 Further, in DeSantis, an additional plaintiff alleged 
he was terminated for wearing an earring to work as a school teacher.14 This 
plaintiff alleged that “the school’s reliance on a stereotype that a male 
should have a virile rather than an effeminate appearance violate[d] Title 
VII.”15 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding “that discrimination because 
of effeminacy, like discrimination because of homosexuality. . . does not fall 
within the purview of Title VII.”16 
 
However, in 2001 the Ninth Circuit largely abrogated this holding in 
Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc. to conform to the mandates 
of Price Waterhouse.17 In Nichols, the Ninth Circuit expressly overturned 
DeSantis’ holding regarding discrimination based upon a male employee’s 
effeminacy.18 The Ninth Circuit held that effeminacy was indeed a sex 
stereotype prohibited as described in Price Waterhouse and that insofar as 
DeSantis can be read to conflict with Price Waterhouse, it is no longer good 
 
10 Hively v. Ivey Tech Community College, 853F.3d 339, 346 (7th Cir. 2017). 
11 Williamson, 876 F.2d at 70. 
12 DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327, 328-29 (9th Cir. 1979). 
13 Id. at 329. 
14 Id. at 328. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 331-32. 
17 256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2001). 
18 Id. 
 




law.19 However, Nichols did not go so far as to say that sexual orientation 
discrimination is sex-stereotyping in and of itself. 
 
Williamson’s brief analysis relied solely upon now-abrogated DeSantis. The 
Eighth Circuit’s revisiting of this issue is appropriate to now explain how 
much (if any) of Williamson’s holding remains good law. 
 
Regardless of the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Horton, a circuit split will still 
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